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Since the early 1960’s, Cuba and China have won international appreciation by 
sending doctors abroad to help where they are needed.  While there was surprise in 
some quarters when U.S. military personnel were deployed to combat Ebola in the last 
months of 2014, the Department of Defense actually has a long history of medical 
activity.  In its current form, DoD medical outreach cannot likely garner soft power in 
the way that the Chinese and Cuban programs can, but with a few modifications, the 
U.S. military could be a serious conductor of medical diplomacy that would save 
countless lives and benefit the image of America abroad.   
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Executive Summary 
 Since Harvard’s Joseph Nye first introduced the concept, Soft Power has been 
the definition of a country’s ability to influence the action of other countries without 
the use of military threats or economic inducements.  Although the concept of soft 
power was not formally introduced to the field of international relations until the early 
1990’s, civilizations from Ancient Rome to Ancient China have for millennia 
conducted activities geared toward increasing what would be called soft power by 
modern scholars of International Relations.  In recent years, countries have 
increasingly sought soft power through a variety of methods, the sources of soft power 
primarily falling into three categories: cultural appreciation, the political values a 
country demonstrates at home, and the way in which its foreign policy is perceived.  
China, for example, has built hundreds of “Confucius Institutes” in foreign countries 
aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture.  Japan has gained soft power from 
the appeal of its cultural exports from anime to Hello Kitty.  Many countries have 
invested significant resources in obtaining soft power through foreign aid.   
Despite an uptick in world opinion of the United States after the election of 
President Obama, the general trend line appears to be down, according to Joseph Nye, 
the conceptual grandfather of soft power.  The United States has historically enjoyed 
vast soft power resources.  Despite revelations about domestic spying and other 
infringements on personal liberty, the famous quote used by several Presidents 
describing the America as a “shining city on a hill” remains somewhat true; the United 
States undoubtedly remains the world’s most famous democracy.  American 
television, music and other aspects of popular culture are more prolific now than they 
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have perhaps ever been.  Despite those apparent advantages, however, America’s 
image in the world is less positive than it once was.  The proliferation of American 
cultural products elicits accusations of cultural imperialism, and America’s foreign 
policy (without making a value judgment about its merits), especially under President 
George W. Bush, has often been received negatively.  Although there have been some 
improvements in this regard under President Obama, who at least pays much more lip-
service to the idea of soft power than did his predecessor, the record of his 
administration has been mixed.  Some necessarily combative actions (the drone 
program, for example) and some foreign policy blunders (ignoring the Green 
Movement in Iran, abandoning red lines in Syria, and the failure of any high-level 
members of the Administration to attend the march in Paris following the attack by 
Islamic extremists on Charlie Hebdo, to name a few) have damaged President 
Obama’s image – and, by extension, that of the United States – abroad.  
The world is not becoming any less complicated, and it is likely that the United 
States will continue to be forced to conduct a foreign policy that is at times unpopular.  
In recognition of this reality, it becomes necessary to explore additional measures to 
strengthen American soft power.  One way in which the United States might do this is 
to co-opt and adapt a form of outreach commonly referred to as “medical diplomacy,” 
which is extensively and effectively employed especially by two countries – Cuba and 
China – with which America has often been at odds.  By expanding and further 
utilizing the medical resources of the Department of Defense, the United States could 
save countless lives abroad, and win appreciation in the international community.   
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Medical internationalism has been central to Cuba’s foreign policy since the 
early 1960’s.  Since the program began, over 100,000 Cuban medical personnel have 
practiced in over 100 countries.  In recent years, Cuban medical teams have provided 
medical assistance in the wake of most of the world’s major disasters, taking a leading 
role, for example, in combatting Ebola in western Africa.  The Cubans have also done 
pioneering work in medical education, establishing or teaching in numerous foreign 
medical institutions.  Cuba also established the Latin American School of Medicine 
(ELAM), which has provided free medical education to students from poor 
communities around the world, including some from the United States.  
Cuba’s medical diplomacy has been quite effective at improving relations with 
recipient countries, and has elevated the country on the international stage.  Individual 
countries with negative views toward Cuba have changed their tune after receiving 
Cuban medical assistance, and Cuba’s medical activity has often garnered favor with 
the United Nations and other international institutions.  Cuba’s efforts have even 
resonated in the United States, where high-ranking officials praised Cuban efforts to 
combat Ebola, and President Obama (for a variety of reasons extending beyond just 
Cuba’s medical activity) has taken steps to restore full diplomatic relations with Cuba.  
Medical diplomacy has also had commercial benefits for Cuba, which receives 
compensation from some of the countries it services, as well as the opportunity to 
export its medical products to health markets Cuban activity helped to improve.  
Although Cuban health outreach does not operate perfectly – there is, for example, 
sometimes backlash from local medical practitioners who resent competition – it has 
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undoubtedly worked in Cuba’s favor, and constitutes a resounding foreign policy 
success for this small communist country.   
China began a medical outreach program in the early 1960’s around the same 
time as the Cubans.  Vastly larger than Cuba, China deploys doctors to its client 
countries, primarily in Africa, on a province-by-province basis.  Like Cuba, China has 
established medical training programs abroad.  Although China does not operate an 
international medical school on the scale of Cuba’s ELAM, the PRC does host a 
substantial number of international students, and aims to increase that number as part 
of an overall strategy to obtain soft power.  Medical outreach has also benefited the 
Chinese pharmaceutical industry, which has worked hard to promote their product in a 
variety of ways, including sending it abroad with Chinese medical teams.  
China’s soft power efforts have sometimes been undermined by parallel and 
complicating economic activity, or by instances in which counterfeit medication 
believed to be from China has harmed patients (although these drugs were not 
necessarily furnished by Chinese medical teams).   Despite setbacks like this, Chinese 
medical diplomacy is quite popular with the countries they serve.  African leaders 
promote the medical cooperation as a clear benefit to their countries, and most of those 
countries either help pay for or cover entirely the full range of expenses for the 
maintaining Chinese medical support.  
Although the Cuban and Chinese programs are by far the most prominent 
examples of direct medical diplomacy, other countries have engaged in similar 
activity.  Peacekeeping troops of various nationalities have often cared for patients in a 
way that almost certainly garners soft power.  The United States military has 
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sometimes conducted medical outreach that could potentially result in soft power 
generation, although these activities are usually conducted under the auspices of 
stability operations rather than direct medical diplomacy.  As Ebola spread unchecked 
across western Africa in the summer and fall of 2014, for example, the U.S. military 
(partly at the request of Doctors Without Borders) was a key player in the international 
effort to stop the virus. 
While many were taken aback by what they considered to be the 
unprecedented involvement of the United States military in a global health campaign, 
the DoD and its predecessors have, in fact, a long history of medical activity.  In 
addition to domestic medical activity like research and preparation for potential 
biological threats, the military has often cared for foreign patients in addition to 
American military casualties.  This has often taken the form of disaster relief, or 
efforts to win over local populations in the context of counterinsurgencies, like in the 
Philippines, Vietnam and Afghanistan.  These operations and other medical outreach 
conducted by the military usually take the form of stability operations, which are 
aimed at preventing instability (of the sort that exists in places like Somalia), which, 
the DoD believes, can produce threats such as terrorism.   
Much of the U.S. military’s medical outreach does not translate to an effective 
medical diplomacy program like the ones run by Cuba and China—the current ability 
of the DoD to gain soft power via medical diplomacy is impeded by variety of factors, 
some of which are technical problems.  Although the military conducts widespread 
medical activity, some of which is done with and for foreigners, this activity is ad hoc, 
lacking any deliberate central coordination.  This sometimes complicates medical 
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operations on the ground, hindering the coordination of medical efforts both within 
different branches of the government and with nongovernmental organizations.   
In addition to technical issues that undermine the DoD’s ability to conduct 
medical diplomacy, there are some aspects of U.S. military medical activity that are 
problems more specifically in a medical diplomacy context.  That the military medical 
corps is so dedicated to preserving resources for potential American casualties – even 
at times when it is extremely unlikely that there will be any – conveys an image of 
stinginess and indifference that is not conducive to soft power generation.  Military 
medical operations have also frequently been plagued by missteps grounded in a poor 
understanding of local culture as it pertains to medical practice.  Also, unlike in the 
case of the Chinese and Cuban medical diplomacy programs, U.S. military medical 
outreach is frequently very short term, making it difficult to build serious relationships 
between American doctors and their foreign communities in a way that could bolster 
America’s image abroad.   
If its medical activity were modified and expanded, the United States 
Department of Defense could become an effective conductor of medical diplomacy 
that could garner significant soft power for the United States.  The following 
recommendations are one way in which some of these issues could potentially be 
addressed. 
• The military should expand medical outreach activities that specifically take 
the form of medical diplomacy, rather than just stability operations.   
 
• Congress should dedicate clearer funding for operations that would allow 
greater flexibility.  
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• To streamline the function of military medical outreach activity, the DoD 
should appoint a single coordinator to manage foreign medical activity (with 
sub-positions for various fields as necessary).   
 
• Steps should be taken to improve coordination with outside organizations that 
play a role in health operations.   
 
• Military medical personnel abroad (through training and doctrinal changes) 
should be discouraged from treating foreign patients as less important than 
Americans and from giving the appearance of hoarding medical resources, 
except in cases where U.S. personnel urgently require those resources.  Along 
similar lines, the complex decision as to whether foreign patients should 
receive the highest standard of care or merely the local standard must be 
tailored to the circumstances of operations on a case-by-case basis.   
 
• Increase the length of deployments to allow American doctors to truly connect 
with foreign populations in a way that could foster understanding and build 
relationships.  One way to facilitate this is by creating bilateral relations with 
foreign medical institutions, which could include opening the Uniformed 
Services University of Health Sciences to foreign students even if they did not 
attend undergraduate school at an American institution.   
 
These recommendations will not create a medical diplomacy program on the scale of 
the Chinese or Cuban programs – nor should that necessarily be the goal.  These 
changes, though, could allow the United States to gain soft power from the hitherto 
largely untapped diplomatic resource of the military medical corps.   
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Intro: Soft Power  
Soft power, says Harvard’s Joseph Nye, is the ability of a state to get what it 
wants from other states without directly employing carrots or sticks.  While no terms 
describing soft power existed before Nye coined the phrase in 1990, political units 
throughout history have availed themselves of means besides direct inducement or 
coercion to reach their goals.  The economic and military might of the Roman Empire 
was undeniable, but it also gained influence simply by being admired by outsiders. 
Chinese Admiral Zheng He’s travels during the fifteenth century showcased the power 
of Chinese civilization, earning it respect from and relations with other nations.1  
While the Marshall Plan was a direct economic investment in the rebuilding of 
Western Europe in the wake of WWII, it was more than just a payoff in exchange for 
European loyalty.  It bolstered pro-American sentiment and encouraged opposition to 
the spread of Soviet Communism.  Countless other historical examples of soft power 
prior to its naming abound, and since Nye clarified its existence in 1990, it has become 
a core concept of international relations.   
Soft power is interpreted in a variety of ways.  It is achieved, according to 
former Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, “when other nations admire and 
want to emulate aspects of that nation’s civilization.”2  Nye believes that there are two 
other resources in addition to cultural appreciation from which soft power can be 
acquired: The political values a country demonstrates at home, and the way in which 
                                            
1
 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” 
Survival, Vol. 48 No. 2 (Summer 2006).  Pg. 18. Available: 
http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0606gill.pdf 
2
 Lam Pin Foo, “Only the Tang Dynasty Came Close to Having Influence,” The 
Straights Times, October 26, 1996.  
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its foreign policy is perceived.3  The way in which countries draw on these potential 
sources of soft power varies, as some countries emphasize different strengths.  A 
country with a widely admired culture but a comparatively weak foreign policy, for 
example, would draw more of its soft power from its cultural appeal.   
Many if not most state actors appear to share Nye’s belief that they “have, can 
and should continue to find ways to effectively develop and use this power resource.”4  
In 2007, China’s then-President Hu Jintao identified soft power as a policy priority, 
and the People’s Republic has launched massive efforts at its acquisition since.  As 
other countries like France, Germany and the United Kingdom have also done, China 
since 2004 has built a network of schools abroad, known as Confucius Institutes.  
These schools, aimed at promoting appreciation for Chinese language and culture, 
exist in over a hundred countries; the stated goal is to increase the current number 
(over 350) to a thousand by 2020.5  Other countries also rely heavily on appreciation 
for their culture to gain soft power—Japanese pop cultural exports like anime and 
Hello Kitty, for example, have gained a significant following outside Japan.6  Some 
countries have invested significant resources in soft power through foreign aid.  The 
United Arab Emirates in 2013 committed 1.25 percent of its Gross National Income 
(GNI) to foreign aid, giving the highest percent of any country in the world, followed 
                                            
3
 Joseph Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 
April 29, 2013. Available: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get
_about_soft_power#trending  
4
 Mattern (2005), 588.  
5
 Dustin Roasa, “China’s Soft Power Surge,” Foreign Policy, November 18, 2012.  
Available: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/18/chinas_soft_power_surge 
6
 “Japan’s Soft Power: Squaring the Cool,” The Economist, June 16, 2014. Available: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/06/japans-soft-power  
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by Norway and Sweden (it should be noted that the United States gave more than any 
country in the world in terms of actual dollar amount).7  China has also launched 
massive direct aid programs, especially in Africa, ranging from infrastructure 
construction to medical diplomacy.  “While aid from OECD countries stagnates or 
shrinks under the pressure of budgets and an increasingly skeptical public,” say Claire 
Provost and Richard Harris, “a host of new emerging donors – including Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Iran – are expanding their work in other developing countries.”8 
The United States has traditionally enjoyed vast reserves of soft power.  
“America’s global domination,” says Matthew Fraser in Weapons of Mass Distraction, 
“has been achieved through largely non-military means.” 9  The United States is 
almost certainly the world’s most famous democracy, a fact widely admired in a world 
where democracy is generally considered a good thing (or at least, as Winston 
Churchill famously implied, the least bad option).  American values and popular 
culture have also historically been a tremendous soft power resource.  During the 
Second World War, says Fraser, “Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck conducted 
Disneyland diplomacy to spread American values throughout the world.”10  The power 
of American culture has only increased since.  American television is “watched daily 
                                            
7
 Joshua Keating, “Rich Countries Got More Generous Last Year,” Slate, April 9, 
2014. Available: 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/04/09/new_oecd_figures_the_surprising
_country_that_gives_the_most_foreign_aid.html  
8
 Claire Provost and Rich Harris, “China commits billions in aid to Africa as part of 
charm offensive,” The Guardian, April 29, 2013. Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/interactive/2013/apr/29/china-
commits-billions-aid-africa-interactive 
9
 Matthew Fraser, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire 
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003). Pg. 10.  
10
 Fraser (2003), 9.  
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in virtually every corner of the earth where TV sets can be found,”11 and American 
pop-stars have found receptive audiences from Indonesia to Africa.  American 
products from Nike shoes to iPhones are sought after in most of the world.  Kentucky 
Fried Chicken has opened a restaurant in Tiananmen Square, and at Disneyland in 
Paris, “café intellectuals drink Coca-Cola while railing against American ‘cultural 
imperialism.’”12   
During the twenty-first century, however, the United States has seen a decline 
in its soft power, which Nye attributes in large part (citing polling data) to its foreign 
policy.13  Some dismiss this decline, noting that the United States has recovered in the 
past from ill will brought on by foreign policy decisions.  The recent decline, however, 
should not be dismissed on the same basis, since, as Nye points out, “that was against 
the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as 
the greater evil.”14  This decline seems to be especially pronounced among young 
people.  Although young people widely admire American pop culture, Nye says, “the 
unpopularity of our foreign policy decisions is causing the next generation to question 
American power.”15  Problems in one of the three areas of potential soft power 
generation can undermine the other sources of soft power – the unpopularity of U.S. 
foreign policy sometimes leads to declining interest in American culture and products 
as well.16  Although American popularity abroad improved after the election of 
                                            
11
 Fraser (2003), 10-11.  
12
 Fraser (2003), 10.   
13
 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” in  
 Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2004. Pg. 255.  
14
 Nye (2004), 257.  
15
 Nye (2004), 256.  
16
 Fraser (2004), 12.  
 14 
President Obama17 – who certainly pays greater lip service to soft power than did his 
predecessor – the record of his administration is mixed.  Some necessarily combative 
actions (like the drone program, and various other military actions) combined with 
some foreign policy blunders (like ignoring the Green Movement in Iran and skipping 
the march in Paris following the attack by Islamic extremists on Charlie Hebdo, to 
name a few) have damaged President Obama’s standing – and by extension, that of the 
United States – abroad.   
Despite some improvement in America’s image after President Obama’s 
ascendency, and the widespread foreign appreciation for American popular culture, it 
is likely that America will continue to be forced in the future to conduct an aggressive 
foreign policy that is at times unpopular.  The United States, thus, must look for more 
opportunities to garner soft power.  One way in which America could do this is to co-
opt and adapt a form of outreach used especially extensively by Cuba and China, two 
countries with which America admittedly shares very little.  By expanding and further 
utilizing the medical resources of the Department of Defense, the United States could 
save countless lives abroad, and win appreciation in the international community by 
conducting what is commonly referred to as “medical diplomacy.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
17
 “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World,” Pew Research Center, 
July 23, 2009.  Available: http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/07/23/confidence-in-
obama-lifts-us-image-around-the-world/ 
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Overview of Cuba and China’s Medical Diplomacy Programs 
Cuba 
 A specific focus on medicine has been a substantial part of Cuba’s post-
revolutionary political philosophy.  “From the outset of the revolution,” says Julie 
Feinsilver, Fidel Castro “made the health of the individual a metaphor for the health of 
the body politic.”  This focus on healthcare by the Cuban government is obvious 
domestically—between 1970 and 2005, the number of Cuban healthcare workers 
tripled, the ratio of doctors to population moved from one doctor per 1,393 people to 
one per 159.18  As a result, Cuba’s domestic healthcare system is far superior to other 
developing nations, and their healthcare outcomes often rival even some of the world’s 
most advanced countries.  Life expectancy in Cuba, for example, is the same as it is in 
the United States, and infant mortality is actually lower on this small Caribbean island 
than it is in the world’s most powerful country.19   
Cuba’s focus on healthcare is also obvious in its medical diplomacy program.  
Castro’s government began what was initially an ad hoc program of medical 
internationalism soon after their revolution.  According to John Kirk, the early stages 
of the program were a series of responses to emergencies abroad, assistance given 
without consideration of cost or benefit.20  Cuba dispatched medical resources to Chile 
in the wake of a major earthquake there in 1960 and sent doctors to Algeria several 
years later during the mass-exodus of medical professionals there.  As the program has 
                                            
18
 Julie Feinsilver, “Cuban Medical Diplomacy: When The Left Has Got It Right,” 
Counsel on Hemispheric Affairs, October 30, 2006. Available: 
http://www.coha.org/cuban-medical-diplomacy-when-the-left-has-got-it-right/  
19
 Feinsilver, 2006. 
20
 John Kirk, “Cuba’s Medical Internationalism: Development and Rationale,” Bulletin 
of Latin American Research, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2009.  Pg. 506. 
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grown, the amount of medical assistance this small island nation has provided is 
staggering.  Since 1961, more than 130,000 Cuban health workers have practiced in 
102 countries.  As of 2009, there were nearly 37,000 Cuban medical professionals (not 
all doctors) working in 73 countries or territories21 (by 2014, this number increased to 
50,00022) caring for 70 million patients.  This represented more medical personnel 
than was fielded at the time by the entire G-8 combined (this being prior to Russia’s 
ejection from the group).23   
Over the years, Cuba has been heavily involved in alleviating health crises, 
offering medical aid to virtually any country where disaster has struck, regardless of 
the state of political relations between Cuba and the recipient of aid.  In 2005, for 
example, Cuba offered to send 1586 medical personnel and 36 tons of medical 
supplies to assist New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (assistance the Bush 
Administration turned down).24  Predictably, as of October 23 2014, Cuba had fielded 
“the largest medical team in west Africa battling Ebola.”25  
In addition to sending their own doctors abroad to deal with health crises and 
help establish better health systems in other countries, Cuba has done pioneering work 
in medical training.  Believing education is essential to having a sustainable impact on 
the healthcare situation in aid recipient countries, Cuban medical personnel established 
medical schools or taught in preexisting medical education institutions in a variety of 
                                            
21
 Connor Gorry, “Cuban Health Cooperation Turns 45,” MEDICC Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 3, 2008. Pg. 44-47, available: http://medicc.org/mediccreview/articles/mr_22.pdf  
22
 Connor Gorry, “Cuba calling: what this small island can teach the world about 
disease control,” The Guardian, October 23, 2014. Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2014/oct/23/cuba-healthcare-lessons-ebola-sierra-leone-guinea-liberia 
23
 Kirk (2009), Pg. 497.  
24
 Kirk (2009), Pg. 497.  
25
 Gorry, 2014.   
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countries, a process that has continued since the 1970’s.26  In 1998, the Cuban 
government established the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM), which is 
geared specifically toward training students from poor communities around the world, 
including even some Americans per an arrangement reached at the turn of the century 
between Fidel Castro and the Congressional Black Caucus (as of 2012, Cuba no 
longer planned to accept students from the United States beyond those already 
enrolled in the school).27  Every year, ELAM accepts 1,600 new students into their 
six-year program, the largest medical school in the world,28 a majority of whom now 
are women.29   
Performance of ELAM graduates on medical licensing tests in their home 
countries, among other things, indicates that the school provides a high quality of 
education.30  Indeed, since ELAM students are expected to work in areas that lack 
medical supplies and infrastructure, resourcefulness is taught to students at this school 
perhaps more than at most other medical institutions.  According to American ELAM 
students Razel Remen and Lillian Holloway, Cuban professors at ELAM frequently 
ask their students questions like “how would you make the diagnosis if you were 
working in the middle of the Amazon and did not have access to any diagnostic 
tests?”31 Students attend for free in exchange for the promise that they will work in 
                                            
26
 Feinsilver, 2006.   
27
 Catherine Porter, “Cuba-trained doctors making difference around the world,” The 
Toronto Star, June 2, 2012.  Available: 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/06/02/cubatrained_doctors_making_differen
ce_around_the_world.html  
28
 Porter, 2012. 
29
 Kirk (2009), Pg. 497, 502.  
30
 Feinsilver, 2006.  
31
 Razel Remen and Lillian Holloway, “A Student Perspective on ELAM and its 
Educational Program,” Social Medicine, Vol. 3 No. 2, 2008 Pg. 160.  
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underserved communities upon graduation.  Although this promise is not formal, 
about 80 percent follow through32 despite pernicious efforts by at least one U.S. based 
NGO to lure ELAM graduates into defection.  The extent to which ELAM’s graduates 
seem to believe in giving back is exemplified by the hundreds of graduates who 
returned to help deal with the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti that killed 300,000 in 
2010.  Eladio Valcarcel Garcia, one of the ELAM’s founders, proudly recounts that 
after so many ELAM alumni from around the world volunteered to assist in Haiti, “we 
had to stop calling.  All of them said yes.”33  After the initial success of ELAM, Cuban 
medical personnel have led in the creation of a second ELAM, a sister school of sorts, 
in Venezuela.   
Cuba’s medical diplomacy program has been quite effective at improving 
bilateral relations with recipient countries and elevated Cuba’s status in the 
international community.  Countries with poor relations with Cuba have often changed 
their tune to some extent after Cuba willingly provided them with medical aid 
regardless of diplomatic tensions (as in the case of Guatemala in 1998, when 
Guatemala reopened a diplomatic relationship with Cuba after the latter sent them 
hundreds of doctors after a devastating hurricane).34  “While it is unclear if medical 
internationalism is just a cold analytical move to win ‘symbolic capital’ and political 
support for Cuba,” says Kirk, “what is indisputable is the success that Cuba has 
enjoyed in international fora.”35 Every year for more than two decades, for example, 
the U.N. General Assembly votes overwhelmingly against the American embargo of 
                                            
32
 Porter, 2012.  
33
 Porter, 2012.   
34
 Kirk (2009), Pg. 505.  
35
 Kirk (2009), Pg. 504.   
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Cuba (the vote in 2014 was 188-2, Israel being the only country to vote with the 
United States), and this year, Latin American countries defied American objections 
and invited a Cuban delegation to the Summit of the Americas.36   
Cuba’s efforts have had an impact even in the United States.  Calls 
domestically to end the embargo have even appeared with increasing frequency, as in 
the case of this New York Times editorial praising Cuba’s activity vis-à-vis Ebola: 
“This should serve as an urgent reminder to the Obama administration that the benefits 
of moving swiftly to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba far outweigh the 
drawbacks.”37  Even some high-ranking U.S. officials from Secretary of State John 
Kerry to U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power have spoken more positively of Cuba 
lately in the context of Cuba’s role in fighting Ebola.38  Despite being unable to 
singlehandedly repeal the embargo (an action that now requires Congressional 
authorization), President Obama, for a variety of reasons, recently moved to restore 
full diplomatic relations with Cuba.39   
There is evidence also of a commercial benefit to Cuba accruing from their 
medical diplomacy program.  The degree to which recipients of Cuban aid compensate 
Cuba varies based on the ability of recipients to pay.  While the rate at which Cuba is 
compensated (if paid at all) is well below market value, it is estimated that medical 
                                            
36
 Jon Lee Anderson, “Cuba’s Ebola Diplomacy,” The New Yorker, November 4, 2014.  
Available: http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/cubas-ebola-diplomacy  
37
 The Editorial Board, “Cuba’s Impressive Role on Ebola,” The New York Times, 
October 19, 2014.  Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/opinion/cubas-
impressive-role-on-ebola.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=c-
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diplomacy brings Cuba more profit than does their tourism industry.40  Furthermore, 
Cuba produces up to about 80 percent of the medicine their doctors use at a fraction of 
the cost of what is charged by multinational pharmaceutical companies.41  Although 
many of the governments that contract Cuban medical services provide the medical 
equipment, the spread of Cuban doctors to so many countries could increase Cuba’s 
ability to export medical products.  Indeed, although exact sales data is difficult to 
come by, Cuba exported medical biotech products to as many as 40 countries as of 
2006,42 and has joint ventures with companies in a variety of different countries, 
especially in Asia.  Cuba’s extensive medical cooperation with Venezuela in particular 
has been a boost for Cuba’s economy; it is essentially a direct trade for oil, of which 
the small island country is in desperate need.   
Although widely hailed as an extremely successful program, Cuba’s medical 
internationalism does not operate flawlessly.  While not particularly successful, efforts 
have been made by forces in the United States to sabotage the program by targeting 
Cuban medical personnel directly.  The Bush administration took steps to make life 
difficult for potential ELAM students and graduates (by restricting travel and other 
such measures), and NGO’s like the Miami-based Solidaridad Sin Fronteras 
(Solidarity Without Borders, an unsubtle play on “Doctors Without Borders”) 
encourage Cuban doctors to defect via a special visa program created by the Bush 
administration in 2006.43  Despite editorials occasionally appearing in the United 
States positing ill-treatment by Cuba of its medical personnel (one particularly frantic 
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op-ed referred to Cuba’s doctors as “slaves in white coats”44), as of 2009, only about 
two percent of Cuban medical personnel abroad had chosen to defect, whereas about 
nine percent of Canadian medical graduates leave for the United States every year.45   
Critics also charge that after failing to spread communism via guns and 
guerillas, Castro has switched to ‘doctor diplomacy’, sending medical personnel 
abroad to spread ideology.  These claims might have some merit if Cuban medical 
diplomacy was a recent development, but as the program has existed for half a 
century, it can hardly be seen as a pivot.  Also, writes Feinsilver, Cuban doctors are 
not a fifth column promoting communism; rather they threaten the status quo by 
setting a good example of providing medical care in poor areas avoided by local 
doctors.46   
In this regard, Cuban doctors have sometimes made enemies of local medical 
associations and personnel who resent competition from their Cuban counterparts.  In 
some countries, medical associations have gone on strike protesting the influx of 
Cuban personnel.  Almost invariably, though, those country’s governments have sided 
against their own medical personnel and defended the Cubans.  Bolivian President Evo 
Morales, for example, promised that the Cubans would stay so long as he continued to 
hold office.  According to Feinsilver, “the benefits to the host society far outweigh the 
costs to the local medical professions,”47 so the governments (and often the citizens) 
of host countries accept and appreciate the Cuban medical personnel despite angering 
local medical associations.  Despite these small issues and setbacks, even many of 
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Cuba’s avowed critics recognize that Cuban medical diplomacy is producing positive 
effects, both for Cuba and for the countries served by their medical personnel.48   
 
China 
The first Chinese medical teams arrived in Algeria (like those from Cuba) in 
1964 soon after the French withdrew from their former colony.  Since then, says Drew 
Thompson in China Brief, the People’s Republic has “establish[ed] a relationship 
between Chinese doctors and millions of ordinary Africans, and earn[ed] the gratitude 
of many African leaders eager to be seen providing public goods to their citizens.”49  
Rather than a more central system for distributing doctors, China allocates its doctors 
to countries around the world based on which province they are from.  According to Li 
Anshan, a professor of International Studies at Peking University: “In general, 
[Chinese medical teams] are dispatched on the basis of one province per one or more 
African country.”50  This, perhaps, could lead to more personalized relationships than 
if doctors were sent from all over China; it could also potentially decrease the degree 
to which medical diplomacy comes across as centrally controlled propaganda.  
Between 1964 when the program began and 2005, China sent more than 15,000 
doctors to Africa,51 and the scale of the program has grown since China’s substantially 
increased focus on soft power.  “Since the beginning of the 21st century,” says Li, 
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“China has strengthened its international medical cooperation.”52  Reports in China 
differ as to the exact number of countries in which Chinese medical teams are 
currently active, but one source put the estimate as high as 65, including some 
countries outside of Africa (the lowest estimate was in the mid 40’s).53  
Regardless of the specific number of countries to which China sends doctors, 
the program is very well received, and is promoted “by both Chinese and African 
leaders as a tangible public good.”54  “This long term medical cooperation,” says 
Thompson, “builds person-to-person relations between Africans and Chinese, and 
brings benefits to both sides."55  The teams are so popular that most African countries 
receiving Chinese doctors pay the expenses of medical teams themselves, including 
airfares, the stipends of doctors and support staff (Chinese cooks included), and some 
of the medical supplies and equipment brought with the team.  In the case of the 
poorest countries, China covers most of the costs itself.56  “While many countries 
offset the costs of paying the expenses and salaries of the medical teams with grants 
and loans from China or other donor nations,” Thompson continues, “host nations 
repeatedly demonstrate their appreciation by continuing the program and covering the 
expenses of the team out of national budgets.”  Chinese medical teams frequently 
receive national awards in both Africa and China for their contribution.57  In addition 
to their work directly with African civilians, Chinese military doctors have deployed 
with U.N. peacekeeping operations.  Many U.N. soldiers in Africa hail from the 
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continent, which allows China also to build good will among Africa’s military class in 
the same way that by conducting training operations and deployments with foreign 
militaries, the American military builds relationships with the soldiers of other 
countries.   
Chinese medical aid to Africa goes beyond just the many medical teams 
operating on the continent.  Recognizing that malaria is the number one killer of 
African children under the age of five (causing the death of about a million children 
there annually), the Chinese government, says Li, has taken several steps 
simultaneously to combat malaria, including medical teams, training programs, free 
drugs and facilities and several other projects.58  “In 2002, the Chinese Ministry of 
Health conducted a two-part international training course in techniques for the 
prevention and treatment of malaria and tropical diseases, in which 30 students from 
17 African countries participated.”59  After a summit in 2006, China set up a number 
of anti-malaria centers in various African countries where Chinese and African 
malaria specialists can exchange ideas and train more medical personnel.60   
China does not have an operation like Cuba’s ELAM dedicated to training 
foreigners in medicine.  China does, though, welcome a fair number of foreign 
students into its universities (many of whom will almost certainly go into medicine) in 
addition to training medical personnel on the ground in Africa.  It is evident by the 
launch of their ‘bring-in strategy’ (qing jilai zhanlue) that the People’s Republic 
wishes to expand its soft power by encouraging students to attend universities in 
China.  After these efforts, the number of foreign students in China (while still 
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significantly lower than in the United States) has dramatically increased—In 2000, 
China hosted 52,150 foreign students,61 and by 2011, according to the Institute of 
International Education’s Project Atlas, that number reached 292,611.62  While it is 
difficult to say exactly what percentage of foreign students in China are studying 
medicine, it is fair to assume that a significant number of them are.   
The Chinese pharmaceutical industry, which has coordinated with some 
African leaders, has also benefited from China’s medical diplomacy program, 
specifically the focus on malaria.  Claire Provost and Rich Harris claim in The 
Guardian that the objectives of Chinese medical teams in Africa have “expanded to 
include promotion of China's pharmaceuticals such as antimalarials.”63  According to 
Li, “Cotecxin, the most effective anti-malarial drug produced in China, has earned a 
great reputation in Africa.”64  This drug has, since 1996, been carried by all of China’s 
medical teams, and is often donated by Chinese leaders when they visit the 
continent,65 both moves that can be assumed to benefit the industry.   
While the Chinese program of medical diplomacy has won the People’s 
Republic significant respect among those it has served, it faces some serious issues.  
The increase in the number of medical personnel deployed in recent years projects an 
image of strength, but despite this recent push, the long-term viability of the program 
in its current form, despite its having existed for half a century, is increasingly 
                                            
61
 Xiaohe Cheng, “Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power,” in 
Minjiang Li (ed), Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics 
(Landham: Lexington Books, 2009). Pg. 112-113. 
62
 Project Atlas, Institute of International Education. Available: 
http://www.iie.org/Services/Project-Atlas/China  
63
 Provost and Harris, 2013.  
64
 Li (2011), Pg. 13.  
65
 Li (2011), Pg. 16.  
 26 
uncertain.  The provincial structure of the program is becoming a hindrance as rural 
tax reforms have led to shrinking provincial budgets.66  Government doctors in China 
are increasingly called upon to address hitherto neglected public health issues in their 
own country.  Also, as the Chinese healthcare system has become increasingly 
privatized, doctors (who supplement their meager government stipend with patient 
fees and medicine sales) find less incentive to accept two-year postings abroad where 
these private opportunities do not exist.  Indeed, in order to meet their obligations to 
the countries to which they are linked under the medical diplomacy system, wealthier 
provinces where more private opportunities exist “have reportedly been forced to 
recruit doctors from inland provinces” to send in place of their own.67  Unless 
something changes relatively soon domestically (e.g. the Chinese healthcare system 
becomes less privatized, or the provincial structure of the program is altered), this 
system of direct health diplomacy could be at serious risk on the home front.   
Furthermore, some problems have arisen on the other end of the program, in 
the places receiving Chinese medical aid.  Rumors have begun to spread in many of 
the areas most impacted by malaria of fake drugs being introduced.  In Uganda, says 
Kathleen McLaughlin through the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, estimates exist 
that as much as thirty percent of malaria cures are “either fake, substandard or 
counterfeit.”68  News like this undermines China’s attempt to garner soft power with 
the citizens of the various African countries in which they provide aid.  In spite of 
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these recent problems, though, the Chinese program has managed to foster good 
relations with a significant number of recipient countries’ governments (even if some 
of their citizens are wary of Chinese activity), and treat nearly 200 million patients, 
which is no mean feat.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
US DoD Global Health Activity  
Operation United Assistance, the American plan to send 3,000 troops to West 
Africa to help stem the tide of Ebola in the fall of 2014, was the largest humanitarian 
deployment of U.S. forces since the 2004 tsunami that wreaked havoc (killing nearly 
300,000 people70) in Southeast Asia,71 and played a significant role in halting the 
spread of the virus.  In fact, the involvement of the Department of Defense in the fight 
against Ebola was inspired partly by a request for aid from Doctors Without Borders.  
According to Laurie Garrett in Foreign Policy, “never before had the typically 
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pacifist, neutral humanitarian organization asked for military assistance, but the Ebola 
epidemic has exhausted MSF's capacities, and compelled radical policies.”72 
This high-profile deployment to solely and specifically fight the spread of a 
disease caused a significant stir; it was considered a novel and unprecedented idea to 
use the military to fight a disease.  Some reacted positively, believing this showed the 
United States was serious about combatting the disease (the Washington Post said the 
deployment “reflects the growing concern of U.S. officials” about the spread of 
Ebola73).  Others reacted negatively, decrying America’s deployment of soldiers as the 
Cubans deployed doctors.  A characteristically anti-Western op-ed in Russia Today, 
which has come to replace Pravda as the Kremlin’s preferred organ of propaganda, 
best sums up the negative attitudes toward the commitment of U.S. troops in its 
conclusion that “the difference between a nation whose first response to a natural or 
humanitarian disaster is to send doctors and nurses, and a nation whose first response 
is to send troops is the difference between civilization and barbarism.”74   
While this medical deployment of military units received widespread attention, 
it was not the first time the defense department has been used in a healthcare 
capacity—in fact, the U.S. military has been directly involved in significant medical 
activity for at least a century.  Military medical activity historically has fallen (and 
continues to fall) into three categories, although the results of work in one area can 
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obviously impact the other areas.  The first of these categories is force protection, 
which involves seeing to the healthcare needs of American military personnel.  The 
second is threat reduction, or identifying and confronting potential biological threats to 
the United States as a whole.  The final category is stability operations and partner 
engagement, which is the Department of Defense (DoD) healthcare activity most 
likely to be a source of soft power along the lines of the Chinese and Cuban programs.  
One of the ways in which the military has been most involved in healthcare is 
in the form of research, which can fall into all three categories. Several of the most 
significant medical breakthroughs of the first half of the twentieth century were 
achieved with research conducted by the military.  It was the military, say Josh 
Michaud, Kellie Moss and Jen Kates in a report for the Kaiser Family Foundation, that 
identified mosquitos as the vector by which yellow fever is spread, and the military 
that first demonstrated “the potential health benefits of large-scale malaria and yellow 
fever prevention campaigns.”  DoD-backed research led to the first vaccines for 
influenza and Hepatitis A.75 The military continues to be heavily involved in medical 
research today, in areas ranging from basic force readiness (done by entities like the 
Army’s Military Operational Medicine Research Program76 and the Naval Health 
Research Center77) to breast cancer study at Walter Reed.78   
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In addition to force protection and broader medical research, the military has 
been significantly involved in medical activities in the context of preparing for 
biological threats.  According to the Kaiser report, “DoD seeks to prevent and prepare 
for biological incidents, such as international and domestic infectious disease 
outbreaks and epidemics, whether they be due to natural, accidental, or intentional 
causes.”79  The significance of the latter two causes has intensified of late in the 
context of biologists’ increasing ability to manipulate genetic material in microbes, 
which, as I stated in an article for Science Progress, can “be used to create particularly 
dangerous pathogens” that could potentially escape a laboratory or be developed for 
use in terrorist attacks.80   
 
Historical Overview of Military Medical Outreach 
The area of military medical activity that shares the most with the Cuban and 
Chinese programs (and the area with the greatest potential to be converted for use in a 
soft power capacity) is termed “stability operations and partner engagement” by the 
Kaiser report.  Although this sort of activity has never been a high institutional 
priority, the U.S. military has a long history of healthcare activity that directly affects 
foreign populations.  During America’s military campaign in the Philippines in the late 
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1800’s, for example, “commanders saw strategic value in implementing health 
services in local communities in order to foster support for U.S. forces.81  
It is difficult to find evidence during the Second World War of an explicit 
objective to win over populations via medical activity.  After the surrender of the 
Axis, however, American military personnel took the lead in rebuilding the devastated 
healthcare systems of both Japan and Germany.  “The U.S. effort to rebuild Japan’s 
public health and health care delivery was quite successful,” says a report by the 
RAND Corporation.  While the United States did good work in Germany, its 
healthcare activities in Japan can be seen as more impressive, since the German 
healthcare system prior to the war was one of the most advanced in the world.  Japan 
had some developed healthcare infrastructure prior to the war including a centrally run 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.  This Ministry, however, did not exercise 
much local control, which was relegated to prefectural governments, and often 
conflicted with the Ministry of Home Affairs, which also had oversight of medical 
personnel.82  Due to this and other issues (like inadequate training), the Japanese 
healthcare system, even before its infrastructure was largely destroyed in the war, was 
“rigidly stratified”; most average Japanese did not see their healthcare improve even 
as the number of doctors was increasing.83 Even this progress was stopped in its tracks 
by the war, in which one in every four of Japan’s hospitals was destroyed.84   
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Following the war, Colonel Crawford Sams, an Army doctor with public 
health experience, was most directly responsible for rebuilding Japan’s health system.  
Working under the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur, 
Colonel Sams focused first on sanitation, nutrition and some immunization with the 
goal of preventing the spread of communicable diseases (typhoid and tuberculosis 
being the most problematic).85  Although Sams sometimes had to fight Washington for 
resources, several of these initial programs were very successful.  Children included in 
a school lunch program, for example, were an inch taller on average than their peers, 
and the program, which was wildly popular among the Japanese citizenry, was 
eventually expanded to eight million Japanese children.86   
Efforts to contain what were known as “wildfire diseases” – those that could 
spread rapidly to epidemic levels – were also largely successful, through vaccination 
and sanitation efforts, and vector destruction (e.g. DDT campaigns to kill mosquitos).  
Prevalence of diseases like diphtheria, tuberculosis, typhus and others decreased in the 
years of American occupation following the war.87  It could be argued that the success 
of American military efforts at rebuilding both the Japanese and German healthcare 
systems were helped by the existence of health systems prior to the war.  What is 
undeniable is that despite a preexisting healthcare infrastructure, Japan’s overall health 
improved significantly during the period in which the U.S. Military was actively 
involved: “The trends in major indicators show,” says the RAND report, “that 
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compared with the pre-war levels, the overall Japanese health status improved 
significantly during the intervention period.”   
Although American military medical personnel almost certainly provided 
direct care to civilians at times during the Second World War, the American focus 
after the conflict was more on rebuilding the healthcare systems of the defeated Axis 
countries on a structural level than it was on individual caregiving of the sort that 
could foster a connection between American doctors and foreign patients (though 
some American actions like the school lunch program were extremely popular with 
Japanese citizens in a way that almost certainly increased American soft power).88  
This direct contact was more deliberately institutionalized during the Vietnam War.  
“In the late 1960s and early 1970s the military campaign in Vietnam featured a 
prominent role for health engagement,” says the Kaiser Family Foundation report.89  
One of the primary ways in which this health engagement with the Vietnamese 
civilian population was carried out was through medical civic action programs 
(MEDCAPs), which are generally short-term assignments (sometimes for training 
purposes) undertaken by military medical personnel.   
Outside major conflicts, the military has at times deployed medical personnel 
as part of other more recovery-based operations.  Military units have frequently been 
involved in humanitarian aid provision following natural disasters, like an earthquake 
in Guatemala in the 1970’s, the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, and a devastating 
earthquake in Pakistan in 2005.  This has also included some deployments besides 
significant natural disasters in the context of post-conflict recovery.  During the 
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1990’s, for instance, American military medical units were deployed to the Balkans 
along with other military personnel.  In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, the military 
worked in support of USAID efforts at reconstructing Haiti’s healthcare system.  “The 
U.S. military helped rebuild hospital and clinic facilities, assisted with rabies control 
and prevention efforts, aided with vaccination programs, and helped provide 
equipment to health care facilities."90  
The recent American military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan add 
additional examples of the role played by military medical activity in the context of 
counterinsurgency, in some ways similar the aforementioned activity in Vietnam and 
the Philippines.  According to the RAND report, “counterinsurgency experts have long 
argued that winning hearts and minds is a key—if not the key—component in 
establishing peace.”91 That such hearts and minds activity is called for in today’s wars 
presents somewhat of a problem for the military, says Lawrence Yates in a paper 
written for the Army.  This is because the military has focused most of its attention on 
fighting or preparing for conventional wars, despite the fact that the vast majority of 
wars in which the United States have been involved have been smaller unconventional 
conflicts (America has fought just eleven “conventional” wars, of which only four 
have been total wars, and all of which had some unconventional aspects).92  “One 
trade off for this preoccupation with conventional warfare,” Yates continues, “has 
been the military’s general disinclination to study and prepare for what, in current 
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jargon, is referred to as stability operations.”93   
Stability operations, says Yates citing a draft of a military field manual, are 
conducted with the goal of establishing and promoting security and control over areas, 
and entail using military resources to “establish, safeguard or restore basic civil 
services.”94  Although Yates says the military has conducted what would now be 
called stability operations for centuries, DoD interest has increased significantly in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks out of the belief that they are important in the context of 
preventing terrorism.  According to the 2002 National Security Strategy cited by the 
Kaiser Family Foundation report, “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that 
weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as 
strong states.  Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers.  Yet 
poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist 
networks.”95  
The RAND Corporation report argues for the importance of healthcare system 
promotion in contexts like Iraq and Afghanistan, declaring: “nation-building efforts 
cannot be successful unless adequate attention is paid to health.”96  The report’s 
authors posit a direct link between health and security in a hearts and minds context: 
Health can have an important effect—positive or negative—on 
security. In Japan [in the aftermath of the Second World War], the 
introduction of powdered milk into schools created a reservoir of good 
will that contributed to a benign security environment. In Iraq, 
however, there is evidence that poor health conditions—especially poor 
sanitation conditions—contributed to anti-Americanism and support for 
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the insurgency.97  
The Taliban also appears to have grasped the value of healthcare provision as a means 
of securing local support.  According to an article in Defense Horizons by Colonel 
Donald Thompson, an Air Force flight surgeon: “Insurgents have provided medical 
services to win over the rural population; Taliban-owned hospitals operate in Pakistan 
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and provide medical services to Afghans in the 
region.”98  
 
 
Problems with the Military’s Recent Healthcare Outreach Activities  
The DoD’s increased attention to stability operations is a good thing, but many 
of the flaws that have traditionally plagued its healthcare outreach activity (like low 
prioritization and lack of coordination) continue to persist, and will need to be 
rectified if the military is to become a serious engine of medical diplomacy.  Although 
some minimal steps have been taken to unify the bureaucracy that underpins U.S. 
military medical activity, this activity remains disorganized, lacking a clear source of 
central authority; there does not appear to be an explicit medical outreach program as 
such.  This often undermines the effectiveness on the ground of military medical 
outreach, blunting its potential diplomatic impact.  This disorganization includes 
difficulty coordinating between different parts of the government and with NGO’s that 
often take the lead in global health activity.   
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In addition to technical issues that undermine the DoD’s ability to conduct 
medical diplomacy, some deliberate policy decisions about DoD medical activity 
create public relations problems that blunt the diplomatic impact of medical outreach.  
Although the Military Health System has extensive resources at its disposal to care for 
American military personnel abroad, it is often hesitant to extend the same care to 
patients outside the U.S. military.  This, and the frequently-employed rule that the 
medical corps provide locals medical attention only up to the local standard of care 
(although the reasons for this are many, complicated, and sometimes well-justified in 
certain contexts), does not project the image of benevolent American generosity that 
would improve American soft power.  Medical outreach has also sometimes been 
undermined by a failure to understand local culture, which can degrade both the ability 
to practice medicine effectively and to garner soft power.  Even if most of these issues 
were addressed, the short periods during which military medical teams are usually 
deployed does not often afford enough time for those teams to make a serious 
diplomatic impact.  
The first of several flaws with America’s medical stability operations is 
significant disorganization in the bureaucracy behind them.  While the DoD is 
engaged in significant medical activity, these efforts have not been undertaken 
intentionally with any particular goal in mind—there is no actual program.  “Myriad 
DoD programs have an impact on global health, but each has different and sometimes 
conflicting objectives,” say Eugene V. Bonventre, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Stacy M. 
Okutani in a report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.99  According 
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to the Kaiser Foundation study, some steps have been taken to organize DoD medical 
outreach bureaucracy, but as of 2012, “there is no overarching policy or strategic 
document that guides the Department [of Defense]’s global health related efforts.”100  
In 2011, says Daniel, the DoD created the position of “DoD global health engagement 
coordinator,” a military position in an office “under the undersecretary of defense for 
policy” (for the sake of comparison, Cuba’s program is run by a Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Relations).101  While this laid the groundwork for increased coordination 
within the military vis-à-vis health efforts, this alone will not turn existing military 
medical activity into a serious conductor of health diplomacy.  Both the Chinese and 
Cuban programs are organized around ideas of improving global health and gaining 
soft power, but America’s programs look more like ad hoc, whack-a-mole efforts at 
maintaining a standard of healthcare in areas effectively controlled by the U.S. 
military in the wake of an armed intervention.   
This internal disorganization has undermined efforts at post-conflict 
stabilization even in countries where the military is heavily focused, says Colonel 
Thompson.  “Interagency coordination defects… have plagued the United States in its 
broader approach to post-conflict stabilization efforts.”102  In the context of a war, one 
department of the American government is expected to take primary responsibility 
while the others work in a support capacity (during the fighting the Defense 
Department takes the lead, during the post-conflict negotiations the State Department 
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takes on the primary role).  This makes sense in a conventional war, but in an 
insurgency situation (of the sort where stability operations would be the most 
effective), this method of coordination falls apart in the face of security persistent 
threats and hearts and minds issues.103   
The flaws inherent in this strategy have been particularly clear in Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  “Nowhere is this disorganization more apparent, nor have more 
opportunities been lost, than in the areas of health and medical care in Afghanistan”, 
where “poor resource support and central coordination for local efforts are hampering 
the local and regional counterinsurgency impact of” NATO Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs).104  One of the highest-ranking American military medical personnel in 
Afghanistan during 2006 and 2007, Thompson goes on to describe one instance where 
it took months of negotiation to assign two technical experts from the U.S. Public 
Health Service Commissioned Corps (under the Department of Health and Human 
Services) to the Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (under the 
Department of Defense).  These technical experts had extensive experience in 
communicable disease control, food and drug safety, and “development of basic health 
services across cultural barriers” – all skills that would have been highly valuable to 
the health mission in Afghanistan.  Despite the fact that these DHHS employees had 
worked across a variety of federal departments domestically, it took a full 18 months 
before their expertise could be brought to bear by the DoD due to a bureaucratic 
technicality about working abroad.105 
In addition to interagency coordination issues, efforts are sometimes hampered 
                                            
103
 Thompson (2008), Pg. 3.  
104
 Thompson (2008), Pg. 3.   
105
 Thompson (2008), Pg. 2.   
 40 
by the complexity and difficulty of receiving funding for development-related 
missions; it is often difficult for projects to obtain financial support when Congress 
has not specifically allocated money.  “The complexity of the Federal Acquisitions 
Regulations (FAR) often results in missed opportunities to act quickly in restoring 
essential services,” say Merriam Mashatt, Major General Daniel Long and James 
Crum in a report for the U.S. Institute of Peace.106  In his article, Colonel Thompson 
describes one such missed opportunity.  In the Kunar province, Taliban militants 
maimed locals who assisted the NATO PRT’s in an effort to undermine 
counterinsurgency development efforts.  When the PRT commander sought funding to 
provide the victims with reconstructive surgery in a hospital in Kabul operated by 
CARE international (a healthcare NGO), that funding was denied by the U.S. Central 
Command Humanitarian Assistance coordinator.  The mere $430,000 required would 
have paid to train two Afghan plastic surgeons per year and provide reconstructive 
surgery to 30 patients in the same period of time.  “Funding this initiative,” says 
Thompson, “would have been a relatively inexpensive way to show U.S. support for 
local populations, would have helped boost local morale, and would have built needed, 
sustainable capacity in the Afghan health sector.”  Even when funding does come 
through, red tape surrounding its allocation could potentially dull the impact of 
projects by delaying the arrival of financial support.  The Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency and the CDC, for example, worked together to assist Uganda and Vietnam in 
developing health capabilities necessary to meet the requirements of the 2005 
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International Health Regulations.  According to J. Christopher Daniel in a Center for 
Strategic and International Studies report, “the partnership has helped lay the 
foundation for the Global Health Security Agenda, launched in February 2014.” This 
success occurred, though, “despite challenges related to interagency money 
transfers.”107  The same report calls on Congress to facilitate easier and more flexible 
mechanisms for this sort of operation.108 
In addition to problems coordinating coexisting U.S. government efforts at 
health outreach, the DoD has suffered problems operating alongside various outside 
organizations providing healthcare.  In situations where multiple organizations are 
trying to provide services to the same population, it is often helpful when one 
particular group is declared the “lead actor,” and, according to the RAND Corporation 
report, “It can be difficult to agree on a lead actor, since donor states, international 
institutions, and NGOs generally have different priorities, interests, and strategies.”109  
While American military medical forces cooperated well with NGO’s in their efforts 
at rebuilding the healthcare systems in Japan and Germany, the international system of 
healthcare NGO’s was far less developed; there were fewer metaphorical strings to be 
tangled than there are today.  When the military deployed doctors to Haiti alongside 
aid workers from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
“one of the challenges the international relief community faced was how to integrate 
the efforts of U.S. military medical units into the larger humanitarian relief and 
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rebuilding efforts,” according to the RAND Corporation report.  The language of that 
statement implies that, unlike the successful postwar reconstructions led by the armed 
forces in the 1940’s, the military may be less effective in a relief effort where it is not 
the lead actor.  
Even in recent situations where the military is clearly in charge, though, the 
difficult task of coordinating with the larger numbers of actors that are now relevant 
has complicated the development efforts of the DoD.  During the rebuilding of Iraq’s 
healthcare system, say doctors David Tarantino and Shakir Jawad, there was “a critical 
need for improved coordination across the DoD, USG, host nation, coalition, IO, and 
NGO leadership.”110  Due to the similar lack of cooperation in Afghanistan, Dr. 
Thompson called for the establishment of a health sector reconstruction office that 
would “integrate and unify nationwide planning and implementation with the 
government of Afghanistan, representatives of other nations, and international 
organizations and NGOs.”111   
Poor communication between NGO’s and the military has sometimes resulted 
in the alienation of healthcare NGO’s working in conflict zones.  According to the 
Kaiser Foundation report, “In certain circumstances, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 
NGOs have at times expressed reluctance or refused to work with DoD, because they 
believe doing so negatively impacts their ability to carry out their work and increases 
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risks to their staff and programs in the field.”112  Better communication, the report 
continues, could clarify “expectations, roles and other issues.”  Another impediment to 
coordination between the military and healthcare NGO’s has been reluctance on the 
part of the military to share information.  “The U.S. Military at times “over-classified” 
information contained in health assessments such as the locations of hospitals and 
clinics, and other health sector information, making it impossible to share this 
information with NGO’s,” say Tarantino and Jawad.113 
Presenting a less directly administrative issue, providing care to anyone other 
than Americans is often a low priority for U.S. Military medical units stationed 
abroad.  According to the RAND report, this was on full display during the U.S. 
Military’s medical mission to Kosovo during the 1990’s, and thrown into particularly 
sharp relief when compared to America’s more medically generous allies in the effort: 
Countries with a long history of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief 
missions, such as Norway and Canada, tended to define their medical 
mission more broadly. In particular, this included involvement with the 
host country and the local community in providing direct medical care, 
as well as undertaking public health activities and helping rebuild the 
health sector infrastructure. U.S. policy tended to favor a narrower 
definition of the medical mission, one that focused on providing 
medical support to the force and provided care to civilians only in 
emergencies. According to U.S. policy, military medical units were not 
to get involved in refugee care or in rebuilding the health care 
infrastructure.114 
 
This policy of strongly prioritizing the health of American soldiers (even when 
they are not particularly at risk) was also in place when the military medical 
corps assisted USAID with their efforts in Haiti.  “The U.S. military’s policy 
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was to transfer civilian patients to local hospitals as soon as possible.”115  Even 
in Operation United Assistance, the DoD’s mission to combat Ebola, U.S. 
military personnel “rarely left their bases.” 116  “The army’s battle against 
Ebola,” says VICE news, did not look like a war. Helicopters flew no dead 
bodies or Ebola patients, or even blood samples. Combat medics treated no 
sick people. Soldiers didn't rescue victims from streets, or enforce quarantines, 
or provide armed security against mobs crazed by fear and illness.”117  That 
American troops worked in relative isolation building facilities that would be 
used in the future to treat Ebola patients certainly kept U.S. forces safer (while 
still helping to an extent to combat the disease) but prevented the sort of 
human contact that would likely have done more to garner soft power.   
The fact that the primary mission of the Military Health System is 
usually considered to be force protection (caring for American troops) creates a 
rationale for saving military medical resources for use on Americans in the 
unlikely event that those medical resources would be tapped out.  A different 
report also published by RAND even decried a tendency of military doctors to 
be too generous with foreigners if explicit rules for medical resource allocation 
were not set prior to the mission.  “Without clear guidelines for giving or 
withholding care,” said this earlier report, “medical providers will tend to react 
to the immediate need, regardless of the long-term consequences for 
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readiness.”118  While this attitude makes sense in the context of the military 
preparedness issues, it is detrimental to the military’s ability to garner soft 
power through medical outreach.  
 Another military policy that impedes potential DoD medical diplomatic 
activity requires that a resident of an area where the military is deployed should 
receive medical attention only up to the local standard of care.  There are legitimate 
rationales for this policy in several military contexts.  In a situation where the military 
has other non-diplomatic objectives, efforts to achieve these objectives could be 
significant impeded by local populations seeking medical services from military 
personnel whose focus is on a different goal. Thus, maintaining a policy of providing 
only the local standard of care prevents a potentially significant distraction from 
affecting the ability of U.S. military personnel to carry out the mission at hand.   
Refusing to systematically provide medical attention above the local standard 
of care also makes strategic sense in the context of a stability operation where the 
objective is to increase the credibility of local institutions.  The goal of stability 
operations is indeed frequently to increase the legitimacy of the local government; 
providing care that goes beyond what the local government can achieve could serve to 
undermine that government.  According to Bonventre, Hicks, and Okutani, for 
example, in 2004 after the Banda Aceh tsunami, the Indonesian government 
complained that healthcare delivered by the U.S. Navy hospital ship Mercy had 
“undermined its legitimacy and authority” since “the standard of care delivered far 
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exceeded what the Indonesian government was able to provide after the ship 
departed.”119  This highlights the need for coordination with the local government in 
the context of a medical diplomacy situation, unless good relations with the local 
government are not considered a priority.  The Indonesia scenario also indicates the 
benefit of American medical personnel potentially remaining in an area for longer than 
just the time it takes to clean up after a natural disaster.   
 The high premium placed on military readiness (to which the second RAND 
report alludes) is another oft-cited reason for rationing military medical resources.  In 
some situations, though, this rationale rings hollow, and it certainly is not helpful 
diplomatically.  In Haiti, for example, the motivation behind the policy of transferring 
Haitian patients as quickly as possible to local hospitals was “to free up inpatient 
capacity in the event of a surge in demand—especially U.S. military casualties.”120  
While it makes sense to preserve military readiness and force protection is and should 
obviously remain a key priority of the Military Health System, it was deeply 
improbable that a military medical unit would be called upon to care for large numbers 
of American soldiers in the context of a development operation in Haiti coordinated 
primarily by USAID.  That being the case, those looking in from the outside could 
view the stockpiling of medical resources that are then not used to help people in 
immediate need negatively, undermining potential diplomatic benefit of the mission.  
This was indeed the case in Kosovo, where the actions of America’s more medically 
generous allies cast a poor light on the U.S. military’s unwillingness to use their 
medical resources more extensively.   
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Differences in coalition partners’ medical policies created unrealistic 
expectations of the U.S. medical units and complicated interactions 
with government officials, the health NGO’s, and civilian healthcare 
providers and civilians.  Local officials, health NGO’s and some 
coalition partners criticized the United States for not allowing U.S. 
medical units to get more involved in healthcare delivery and in 
healthcare reconstruction efforts.121 
 
The impression that the Military Health System is a fancy car that the U.S. is 
unwilling to let out of the proverbial garage will surely not contribute to soft power via 
medical diplomacy—if the military is to conduct more effective health outreach, 
policies restricting the extent to which military doctors are allowed to help the local 
populace should be loosened.   
 Another key to conducting good medical diplomacy operations is the 
ability to conform to or at least be aware of local culture as it pertains to health 
issues.  There are, of course, times when a medical mission must ignore or 
even combat local customs that effect medical practice.  Female genital 
mutilation – widespread in parts of Africa and much of the Muslim world – 
comes to mind.  Whether or not certain local traditions deserve respect, 
awareness of them is essential to both the acquisition of soft power and to good 
medical practice.  A key part of the mission to combat Ebola in West Africa 
was convincing locals to abandon traditional burial rites that involved, says 
Science magazine, “washing, touching and kissing the body” (which, in the 
case of Ebola, remains highly infectious after death).122  According to VICE 
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News, “it took months to convince the majority of families to cease handling 
dead bodies.”123  Awareness of this local practice, though, allowed it to be 
identified early on by epidemiologists as a significant driver of transmission, 
which in turn allowed medical professionals to push safer burial practices that 
decreased transmission of the virus. 
 While sound knowledge of local traditions has helped halt the spread of 
Ebola in West Africa, military medical outreach efforts have sometimes been 
plagued by clumsy mistakes driven by a lack of attention to local culture.  In 
one case Daniels describes in his report for the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, “DoD conducted a medical clinic in a remote village of 
Djibouti, but only three days’ notice to the predominantly nomadic villagers 
resulted in minimal participation.”124  Military medical operations have 
frequently suffered from a poor cultural understanding of the people the 
operation exists to serve.  “Efforts to provide humanitarian medical assistance 
after a major 1976 earthquake in Guatemala were hindered by the inability of 
U.S. military personnel to adapt to local customs,” say doctors Bradley Boetig 
and George Avery in World Medical & Health Policy.125  According to 
Tarantino and Jawad, Military medical operations in Iraq also suffered from a 
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“lack of understanding of the cultural context.”126  In their report, Tarantino 
and Jawad call on the U.S. Government to “expand and improve education, 
training and career development opportunities in the areas of civil-military 
medicine, medical stability operations, and public health and health care 
delivery in international and conflict settings.”127 Given the military’s history 
of missteps vis-à-vis local culture, the DoD should provide “opportunities to 
increase cultural awareness and intelligence.”128 
 The diplomatic impact of military medical outreach has sometimes been 
dampened when poorly conceived and coordinated health operations have had a 
negative impact on local civilian populations.  Many countries, whether intentionally 
or not, create a multitiered healthcare system in which the superior military health 
system is accessible to the dependents of military personnel and political dignitaries.  
This, understandably, leads to resentment amongst those relegated to the often 
underfunded and under equipped civilian healthcare system.  “The United States,” 
Thompson argues, “is developing such a disparate system in Afghanistan by putting 
almost all of its health sector reconstruction resources into the security sector while 
ignoring the civilian sector.”129  While maintaining good relations with foreign 
militaries has historically been a high priority of the DoD, it pays to avoid doing so at 
the cost of alienating foreign civilians.  
In addition to potentially disenfranchising certain populations if they are 
excluded from receiving care, medical diplomacy runs the risk of triggering a backlash 
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from local medical professionals.  These personnel could feel undercut by an influx of 
foreign doctors who sometimes provide better care more cheaply than the local 
doctors, damaging the reputation and bottom line of those local medical practitioners.  
Cuban medical personnel on mission have often been met with hostility from local 
medical associations, says Julie Feinsilver.  Doctors in some countries serviced by the 
Cubans have gone on strike in protest, others have attempted legal action or taken their 
complaints to the press.130  After initially being essential to recovery after a 
devastating earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, American medical personnel became an 
object of resentment for Pakistani doctors who, say Boetig and Avery, “could not 
compete with U.S. units providing a higher standard of care for no cost.”131  Boetig 
and Avery argue that the damage done to the local healthcare system in this particular 
case hurt America’s image with some Pakistanis.  While it is possible that the locals in 
this situation were especially quick to vilify Americans due to other political realities, 
this instance, similar issues in Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami,132 and the 
backlash sometimes faced by Cuban doctors, highlights the importance of 
understanding the local medical situation.  Medical diplomacy or stability operations 
cannot be conducted with the assumption that one-size-fits-all; they must be calibrated 
to the unique realities and needs of the area being served.   
Operations must also identify at whom the “diplomacy” part of medical 
diplomacy is targeted.  Cuban medical outreach is obviously not conducted with the 
aim of winning favor amongst the medical personnel of the countries they serve, it is 
conducted to win over the governments and populations of those countries.  Cuba has 
                                            
130
 Feinsilver, 2006.   
131
 Boetig and Avery (2010), Pg. 74.  
132
 Boetig and Avery (2010), Pg. 74-75.  
 51 
calculated that the diplomatic benefit of their medical operations is worth the cost of 
alienating some local medical practitioners, a calculation that appears to be correct: 
“despite protests (and strikes),” says Feinsilver, “numerous press and other reports 
from different countries extol the benefits to the patients,” whose governments often 
take notice.  The administrations in most countries served by Cuban doctors have 
repeatedly ignored the protests of local medical personnel, since the overall benefit to 
society significantly outstrips the cost to local medical practitioners.133  That Cuban 
medical diplomacy is generally well received by the populations and governments in 
most of the countries they serve – even at the expense of angering local doctors – is 
indication that American doctors abroad could have the same effect despite the 
problems with the medical operation in Pakistan in 2005.  
One of the issues that undermined the medical mission in Pakistan has 
negatively impacted other American medical outreach: medical personnel were 
deployed long enough to displace (and thus draw the ire of) local medical personnel, 
but not long enough to effectively replace them.  The very temporary nature that 
characterizes U.S. military medical outreach sometimes undermines its potential to 
garner soft power via medical diplomacy.  One way of conducting medical diplomacy 
in a more lasting way, suggests Major Bradley Boetig in Military Medicine, is through 
institutional relationships rather than just ad hoc assignments.  Boetig calls for the 
establishment “of enduring, bilateral relationships between U.S. and host-national 
medical institutions,”134 of the sort that are conspicuously more present in the Chinese 
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and Cuban programs, which contain much more extensive cooperation with and 
training of foreign medical personnel.  Institutional (rather than purely individual) 
partnerships, Boetig believes, “would cultivate relationships that endure beyond the 
length of the individual assignment cycle.”135   
Much as the U.S. military’s patient-centered health outreach is basically 
limited to brief, ad hoc missions, often in response to some crisis, the rare occasions 
where military medical personnel work with non-American medical personnel are 
frequently limited to just a few weeks.  While military Medical Readiness Training 
Exercises (MEDRETE’s) that involve foreign personnel are often considered 
successful based on the number of “relationships established,” this model does not 
result in a very permanent connection, since “those relationships are almost always 
fleeting… as individuals move in and out of units quite frequently; and rarely do 
units—let alone individuals return repeatedly to the same location.”136  Compare this 
to the Chinese system, where doctors usually deploy for two years at a time, and 
specific Chinese provinces are paired with individual foreign countries, ensuring a 
more consistent long-term relationship,137 or the Cuban system, where doctors also 
deploy for long periods and significant numbers of medical students are exchanged for 
the entire duration of their medical training.   
The obstacles preventing the military from conducting effective health 
outreach are not insurmountable, but they are many, they are varied, and they require 
attention if the DoD is to become an entity that can successfully conduct medical 
diplomacy in a way that will garner soft power for the United States.  The following 
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recommendations are one way in which some of these issues could potentially be 
addressed.  
 
 
Recommendations  
• The Department of Defense should expand medical outreach, and conduct 
some of these medical outreach activities specifically under the guise of 
military medical diplomacy, rather than just stability operations.  Changing the 
name of something can change its fundamental meaning; military medical 
personnel carrying out missions in this context would likely be more mindful 
of diplomatic objectives if diplomacy were the stated goal.  
 
• Appoint a single coordinator of all DoD medical operations, with sub-positions 
as necessary.  Personnel beneath these positions should be easily transferable 
(including cutting through red tape in dealing with other executive 
departments) in order to avoid the sorts of coordination issues that have 
sometimes plagued military medical operations (like the eighteen months 
required to transfer the three technical experts to Afghanistan during Operation 
Enduring Freedom).138 
 
• Improve coordination with bodies outside the DoD so that U.S. military 
medical personnel can better play a role in health operations that are not under 
the complete (or any) control of the U.S. military.  In the context of USAID 
operations where U.S. military personnel are involved, for example, military 
personnel could be allowed greater flexibility in their orders in a way that 
would allow them to get more directly involved with the aid mission rather 
than just waiting for potential American casualties.   
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• Congress should expand and help streamline funding for health outreach 
operations, allowing greater flexibility and authority for military medical 
personnel on the ground.   
 
• Push back against the idea that foreign patients are less important, at least in 
the context of a medical diplomacy operation (this could be done through 
changes in training or doctrine).  The appearance that American forces 
disregard foreign patients undermines American soft power, especially in 
situations where U.S. forces are deployed alongside personnel from other 
countries who may appear more generous.  Except in situations where there 
could plausibly be an influx of American personnel needing care, U.S. military 
resources should not be hoarded in service to force readiness.  Doing so is 
unnecessary (we are not going to run out of Band-Aid’s anytime soon, and if 
we do, we can easily afford more unless the military budget is significantly 
cut), and projects a negative image of the U.S. military and America as a 
whole.   
 
• Carefully address the question of local standard of care.  In situations where 
soft power can be gained without undermining local institutions (or in 
situations where preserving local institutions is not a high priority), U.S. 
military medical should provide the best care they can; taking better care of 
someone than local resources allow projects a good image of the United States.  
In situations where going above the local standard of care would undermine 
local institutions in a way that could seriously harm either America’s soft 
power or the people American personnel are deployed to serve, medical 
personnel should do their best to adhere to the local standard of care, with the 
hope that the presence of American military medical resources could help 
increase the standard of care over time.   
 
• U.S. military medical personnel should receive more training on the cultures 
and traditions of the places to which they deploy.  Failure to understand local 
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culture as it pertains to medicine has undermined U.S. military medical 
outreach in more than one instance, whereas a proper understanding of local 
culture was essential to the fight against Ebola in the summer and fall of 2014. 
 
• Deployment of U.S. military medical personnel should be long enough to 
ensure that they actually have a diplomatic and medical impact—brief 
deployments are better than none, longer deployments are better than brief 
ones.   
 
• Longer deployments could sometimes take the form of bilateral exchanges 
between existing medical institutions (like military hospitals or the Uniform 
Service University).  Boetig proposes a longer-term bilateral exchange of 
medical personnel in order to “truly acquire the much-hyped ‘cultural 
competency’ skills that have to be earned by actually cultivating a partnership 
that endures beyond a 2-week MEDRETE.”139  A partnership such as this 
would be beneficial for the host institution, whose credibility would likely 
increase with the implicit vote of confidence from the U.S. as indicated by the 
presence of American military medical personnel.  Additionally, established 
institutional partnerships would improve the readiness of medical 
subspecialists, since “there is no better way to maintain their skills than to 
provide our specialists with the opportunity to consult routinely on the more 
challenging cases that arise at partner military hospitals overseas.”140   
 
• The Uniform Services University of Health Sciences should expand 
opportunities for foreign students to take courses there even if they did not 
graduate from an undergraduate institution in the United States (international 
students are currently admitted only if they went to college in America).141 
                                            
139
 Boetig (2012), Pg. 764.  
140
 Boetig (2012), Pg. 764.  
141
 “Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Graduate Programs in 
Biomedical Sciences and Public Health,” Accessed April 1, 2015, 
http://www.usuhs.edu/graded/prospectivestudents.html.   
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These recommendations alone will not turn the U.S. military medical corps into a 
health diplomacy program on the order of the Cuban or Chinese models—nor should 
that necessarily be a goal.  The U.S. Military Health System, though, is a significant 
untapped soft power resource that, with some changes, could save lives and bolster 
America’s image abroad.   
 
